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Marketing and Engineering Strategies for Winning R&D Contracts
Professor Edward B. Roberts
Associate Director
Research Program on the Organization and Management of
Research and Development
M, I„To Sloan School of Management
Dr. Kantrowltz, Ifether Joyce, Dr. Vaughn, ladies and gentlemen!
Today's topic, adapting for sixrvlval In the defense industries, has been
in recent years the subject of much private and public debate. One of the most
controversial documents in the continuing exchange of ideas is a widely circulated
publication of the locally-based consultants, Arthur D. Little, Inc.-'- Of their
conclusions, with which I strongly concior, a keynote is that for assuring sur-
vival we are going to have to focus more and more on problems of marketing for
research and development and managing research and development, 2 Thro\igh in-
creases in the funding and effectiveness of company and government sponsored re-
search and development, corporate and economic growth can be maintained.
Before describing some of my research results on the R&D contract award pro-
cess, I should like to tell you about a newly elected governor and his aide who
were touring the s-tate prison. As they walked through the corridors with the
warden, they heard noises off In the distance. Walking closer they realized that
the noises were the sounds of laughter. Then, as they got even closer, they heard
somebody call out, "Sixty-five I", and there was loud laughter. Someone else
hollered, "Thirty-two!", and there was loud le.ughter again. Then someone called
out, "Twenty-fivel", but there was dead silence. The governor and his aide turned
to the warden and said, "Whafs going on here? This is the state prison. Why all
ISuperscripts refer to entries in the annoted bibliography at the end of this paper.

the laughter?" And the warden explained, "Well, you know, governor. These men
have been here a number of years, and it's pretty dreary here. So they tell
stories to amuse each other. After a period of time it gets bo that they know
each other's stories. To get in more jokes dviring an evening they put numbers
to these stories. This way, they can just say the number, and then everybody
laughs." This sounded reasonable to the governor but he asked, "VOiat about that
guy who called out 'Twenty-five'7 There was dead silence." "Well," answered the
warden, "that was old Joe—he never could tell a good storyl"
Later that week the governor was addressing a banquet, and his aide was
sitting beside him. The govemor thought that his prison tour would provide an
arousing story for the people assembled at the banquet. He got up and started
talking about his trip with the warden, and he was coming up to the point of des-
cribing the laughter they had heard off in the distance. The governor suddenly
stopped short. Turning to his aide with a puzzled look, he asked, "What were
those numbers?"
In case you feel the same way at the end of this talk, I should like to
begin by telling you ray conclusions first, and hopefully you will remember these.
Then, if later you forget the numbers on which the conclusions are based, that
won't be so bad. Actually, I have only one main conclusion, but I want to develop
it for you in two different ways. The conclusion is simply that more than most
of you now believe, and more than your firms act as if they believe, the award
of research and development contracts is not a case primarily of company proposal
preparation followed by government proposal evalviation. Rather, the award of R&D
contracts is a case, much more, of person-to-person contact, principally technical
contact; person-to-person information exchange; and person-to-person development
of confidence and trust. I intend to draw this conclusion for you, and to show
you the evidences that lead to this conclusion, in two ways: first, by looking

at government and at the kinds of activities that our research demonstrates under-
lie the award of government contracts; and second, by looking at industry, and
examining the results of research studies that ve have conducted on companies
attempting to win government contracts « From both perspectives, the government
evidences and the industry data, we shall be led to this conclusion about the
essentiality of the informal person-to-person aspects of the research and devel-
opment marketing situation, in contrast with the lesser importance of the formal
proposal preparation-proposal evaluation aspects.
About four years ago, the M. loT. Sloan School of Management, with the strong
encouragement of Mro James Webb, Administrator of N.A.SoAo, determined that it was
of major importance that we become more actively involved in research and teaching
on the management of research and development*-^ As part of our research program,
I started in I962 a study of the R&D contracting system. The contracting system
regulates the principal portion of our spending in research and development in
the United States, and it seemed important, both in 1962 and now, to find out what
determines the award of R&D contracts, the terms of the contracts, the industry
response to the contracting system, and the like.
We started our research with a series of studies of government agencies and
their practices in awarding research and development contracts , Thusfar^ although
we have examined only three large government procuring installations, we are already
tiring of finding the same results With numerous indications from letters, visits,
and discussions that the results in other places will not be very different, prob-
ably soon we shall draw this phase of data collection to a close.
The research began at one NASA installation where my research assistants and
I looked at a series of ten large awards--all above one million dollars in size,
with an initial range of one to forty million dollars. (As you might expect, in-
cluding changes, growth, and the like, that forty million dollar award is now

about 150 millions.) These large contracts were of interest and fiirnished an
informative pictirre of what happens in the award of R&D contracts. But the situa-
tions studied did not provide sufficient qiiantitative results of the sort that
managers of marketing and engineering activities would like to see before drawing
conclusions on new company policies. Me then turned to two Department of Defense
field centers where we attempted to gather more statistically-oriented data, data
that I am going to present to you this morning. In the first of these installa-
tions we studied forty-one competitions. The competitions resulted in awards of
research and development contracts, ranging from $100,000, the minimum award size
that we chose to include in our study, up to eight million dollars in size. In
this first installation, the awards were made during the period from January, I96O,
to June of 1963. Our second study in another DOD field center covered forty-nine
contract awards, ranging from $100,000 to in this case $2,000,000 in initial size;
and these contracts were in the time period from May, 19^2, to June, 19^^^ the
time that we started gathering the data on this last study. Thus our data are
drawn from fairly current cases, the latter study reflecting whatever influences
the McNamara regime has had on the R&D award process.
The next five figures describe some of the results of these studies. Four
of them show data from the two Defense Department organizations, the results of
the first installation at the top of the page, and organization two down below.
We shall compare the award structure in the two studies on the basis of several
different dimensions » In Figure 1 we look at that measure which most people
think is the most important in R&D awards, or at least it is the most broadcast
as the most important. That measure is the evaluated technical rank of the com-
petitors for an award., What we have done here is to plot a frequency distribution
of the award of contracts as a f\inction of the evaluated technical rank of the
individual companies receiving the awards. In the first organization, the graph
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indicates that 36 contracts out of the ^1 went to the highest technically-ranked
company. T\ro awards vrent to organizations ranked fHwo technically, and so
forth. In organization -#2 where we studied 49 awards, kl of the awards went to
the highest technically-ranked organization, half a dozen went to the second
highest ranked, one vent to the third highest ranked. The technical rank situa-
tion appears to support the general things that everybody says, that in research
and development it's the technical evaluation that counts. Let me urge you,
however, not to draw yovtr conclusions faster than I draw mine.
As you see from Figure 1 not all the awards go to the highest technically-
ranked company , Some of the awards are going elsewhere. There must be some
reason, and, "Of course", you say, "cost certainly comes into the picture." But
let us find out what happens before cost can enter the picture. Figure 2 illus-
trates the workings of the process of technical acceptability evaluation that
comes in betv/een looking at technical rank and looking at cost. The second agency
that we examined was committed to the notion of first qualifying proposals for
technical acceptability and not wasting time examining the cost proposals of any
firm that was not technically acceptable. The same people who did the technical
evaluation determined technical acceptability, of course. The chart of Figure 2
demonstrates that out of the 49 awards that we looked at, in 16 cases only one
company was regarded as technically acceptable. After each such determination,
the award was quite clear--it either went to that "acceptable" company or the job
would be cancelled. We are looking at jobs that were all awarded, so here are
16 cases out of 49 in which only one company survived technical assessment. Going
further, there are I9 cases in which two companies survived the technical assess-
ment and were regarded as technically acceptable. This now gives 35 awards out
of 49, about 70^ of the awards, in which the procurement officer could consider
no more than one or two companies. The next point on the curve represents an
addltioiml ten cases in which three companies were technically acceptable. Thus
-6-
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tions in all of oiir 90 avards, and as ycai well know, the cost gro^rth that takes
place in cost-plus contracting is sufficient to v;holly distort any initial bids
that are presented. Yet we still c^t this perhaps sxirprising picture, that
looking at all the proposals in organization #1 (even those that were not tech-
nically qualified) and in organization v^2 at the technically acceptable proposals
(cost data was not kept on file for those not regarded as technically acceptable),
the low bidder received more awards than any other bidder. This shows up even
though for the second group studied I dropped the sixteen cases in which only
one company was ranked acceptable. (l did not know how to treat that one com-
pany, as a high bidder or a low bidder.)
These results still do not fully explain the R8JD award process. However, we
first had technical evaluation determining so much, and secondly, cost evaluation
apparently explaining much of the rest. But there is one catch. All of these
formal evaliiations, of course, occur after proposals have been solicited, after
proposals have been prepared, after proposals have been received by the govern-
ment agency. But things do take place even before these phases. And one of the
things that takes place before proposal solicitation, preparation, receipt, and
evaluation is that the technical initiator in the government agency prepares a
procurement request (PR) on which he indicates among other things a list of sug-
gested companies he has in mind for doing the job. In our research studies we
went to this source of data, the procvirement request forms in the government files,
and we produced the results shown in the next figure. We have plotted for both
agencies the frequency of awards as a function of the winning company's position
in the list of suggested companies on the procurement request form, made up by
the technical initiator six months to a year prior to the evaluation of proposals.
We have excluded any alphabetical lists, because we do not believe that a company
-9-
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name beginning with "A" is more favorable than one starting with "z" for getting
government business. (l must admit, however, that a recent study that I have con-
ducted of spin-off companies from the M»I.T. Instrumentation Laboratory shows
that TOfo of the twenty-eight spin-off firms have names starting with "A" through
"D". But we shall assume that alphabetic position is not a prejudicial factor.)
Looking at these non-alphabetical cases, we make a very simple hypothesis--that
where a firm's name appears on this list prepared by the technical initiator is
a good indicator of the initiator's preferences. When we plot, as in Figure ^,
the award of contracts as a function of listed position on the PR form, we find
that indeed the data support this hypothesis in both organizations.
We can take one more step with our data. If a company preferred by the
technical initiator and so listed, did not bid (there appear to be numerous slips
of this sort), it is obvious that this preferred company could not win. Revising
the lists by dropping these no-bidders, and looking at the frequency of awards as
a function of those who were listed and did bid, we produce the sharper curves
of Figure 5-
The key question is, "Are the indicators shown in Figures k and 5 important?"
Our answer is obviously, "Yes I" The data shown here are drawn from procurement
request forms that precede by six months to a year the technical evaluation mea-
sures shown in Figure 1. It is almost always the government engineer or scien-
tist who prepares the list incorporated in Figures k and 5 who also prepares the
evaluations that produce the set of technical evaluation curves. Whatever pro-
duces the technical prejudice, the feelings of confidence and trust in one parti-
cular organization rather than in another, that is built into the initiator at
the time that he prepares the procurement request, seems to stick with him
throughout the entire formal competitive process. It is apparent that if you
want to win research and development contracts, you win by competing prior to
-11-
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the preparation of the procvirement requests, not dxiring the period of time of
formal proposal solicitation, proposal preparation, and proposal evaluation. The
proposal solicitation, preparation, and evaluation are responses to a decision
by the technical initiator to undertake a set of technical acts under contract,
It is clear that he generally enters into that set of acts already committed,
at least in his own mind, to one or two companies.
Let me relate some anecdotal Information as to the kinds of things that
some technical Initiators do when they are thwarted in their attempts to award
the contracts to the companies that they technically prefer. As you well know,
not every attempt to issue a sole source award results in a sole source contract.
There are a large number of contracts that are awarded by formal competitive pro-
cesses after the technical initiator has tried very hard to make a sole source
justification. One example copied exactly from an RFP in our sample of contracts
demonstrates the case of the angry initiator who was not allowed to go sole source.
He wrote the RFP so that of the twelve solicited firms, only Company A, the "favored
sole source company", would bid. A few selected lines from the RFP might provide
clues to why none of the eleven other solicited companies bid. To quote, "This
will require that the bidder, in order to qualify, need have a minimum of success-
ful experience with Doppler equipment identical with that developed and operated
by Company A." You don't have to be Company A; you only have to have the same
experience that it has.' Here is another quotation from the same work statement.
"Note: Experience comparable with that shown in the Company A XYZ studies and
major subsequent ionospheric studies will be considered satisfactory." Thus, If
you had all the same experiences as Company A and you were really familiar with
their equipment, there is a good likelihood you could proceed and bid on thisoaitiBct
Ve can provide numerous other examples of certified testimony or extracts
from official government files covering the contract awards in our studies. In
one award case the procurement officer said during our interview that the initiator
-13-

was sold a bill of goods by Company X. Company X, needless to say, got the
award. In another case, "Company Y had worked with the people who had prepared
the work statement, the initiators, had previously done a feasibility study and
obviously had an inside track." Company Y got the award. Quoting from a third
case, "The M agency had quite a bit to do with the selection of the recommended
sources and the evaluator might have been able to have justified a sole soirrce,"
according to the procurement officer. The recommended source, needless to
emphasize, got the award. Says the procurement officer on another award, "Company
N could have been made the sole source." Company N got the award. In still
another case. Company Z vras requested as sole source, but the request was re-
fused. Company Z got the award. And again our interview records state: "Agency
K -Arote the specifications and vas the major participant in the evaluation.
Agency K had a predisposition towards Company R." Company R got the award.
Fe can repeat simj.lar occurrances time and time again. We can cite not
only subtle approaches, but in some cases really malicious approaches by the
tachrical initiator to make sure that his opinion would not be thwarted by the
formal practices of procurement. These government technical people are not risk-
ing their jobs because of political pressure or due to any graft or corruption
reasons. They act this way because at the time they are ready to go out on con-
tract, they are truly convinced that one or two particular companies are the
companies to do this work, that no other company could carry out the work as well
for the good of their program objectives and for the good of the government.
They fear that the formal procurement mechanisms are going to halt them from
being able to award the contract to the organization in which they have confidence.
Before finishing this aspect of discussion, I should like to describe some
interesting results that have come from a study being done at M.I.T. on the deter-
minants of technical effectiveness.^ Using data from twenty-two R&D contract

compctitionc, the researcher hao fp-uphcd the average effort for all the biddoro
rcccivinc a fiivcn technical rank. Figure 6 illustrates these results, #1 bcir.3
the highcct technical rank. In general, the data produce a U-ohaped curve, in-
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dicating that if a company is above some threshold level of conrpetence, putting
in more proposal effort results in a higher evaluated technical position. Below
this threshold level of competence, putting in more effort apparently demonstrates
company ip;norance more clearly, liut the one nziin exception to this U-shape is
the CO].: a.;y ran]icd
vl 1 teclmically, ^rho tisually is t^he winner of the award,. As
you can zee, the -„ 1 tcchnically-ovaluatod firm jjuts less effort on the average
into the proposal than its ]}2f )'i2, )'i'^, and -l,^ technically- ranked competitors.
Our own results provide the reasons for this curve. The #1 technically-ranked
company is not competing primarily by means of proposal competition. It is com-
peting largely through the pro-selling efforts that have been addressed to the
teclmical organization in general. This pre-selling has caused the company to
be ranked i,'l technically.
In closing this phase of discussion I shall make one comment in passing.
IVo months from now, at the Office of Naval Research Conference on Research Pro-
gram Effectiveness, I intend to examine the cost/effectiveness of this R&D pro-
curement system that so often seems to necessitate six to eight months worth of
foriral proposal preparation and competition by industry, apparently for little
or nought. 5 There is grave doubt in my mind that we should be straining and
stressing so much these formal procedures that our Secretary of Defense tells
us produce cost savings every time we instigate them farther in the Department
of Defense. Our research evidences suggest the counter-conclusion that the
formalization of research and development procurement procedures, where informal
understandings already exist and where personal commitments have been made (at
least mentally if not orally), adds great expense and probably diminished effec-
tiveness to our nation's R&D efforts.
Let me now turn to a very different source of evidence, resulting from the
research we have carried out as backup to our government studies. We decided
• -16-

to try to cct better industry iixforiration on the P.tD a^./ard procc::s. In the
second covcrnnent orcanization studied, ve preparen a listing of all of the
coiq^anicc irvcTved in all of the CGr.t;"acti" in our sample. (Actui-.lly, we ex-
clv.d!.";'^ th:/e''^ lO'itrrcos becsxis'; ..'.? 'id not hc^ve total information on all the
fiiTis in/olvod. ) T'.;o-parc GU"~i,ionnr:ires '.,'erc railed to all companies directly
involved in any ',<'sy--solicited "nit no bid. solicited but no response, bid and
lost, bid and von- -on ho avarcis stu'iied in the second agency, a total of approx-
imately 1200 companies, -e have noi' received useable replies from about forty
per cent of these companies, including about 55fo of the winners, and have begun
to process som^e statistical analyses of these replies."
The results analyzed confirm first of all that there are great distinctions
between bidders and no-bidders. As we look at those companies that were solici-
ted but no-bid, we can make additional comments on the cost/effectiveness of
this /'jovernment procurement situation. Clearly the no-bidders in the h6 research
and development awards examined were not really related to the situations under
contention. If we compare the no-bidders knowledge, their experience, their
prior contact with the customers, etc., against the data from the companies that
bid, bidders are shown to be grossly different from no-bidders (statistically
significant at the l/lO of Vfo level). The aggregate of no-bidders do not know
the initiator, they have not done prior work for him or his group, have not
submitted unsolicited proposals in the area, they do not know the funding, they
did not anticipate the RFP, they did not have contact with the government tech-
nical people, they thought the job belonged to somebody else, they did not think
the job belonged to them. In fact, they did not even know who their competitors
might be. On every dimension examined, the no-bidders are "out of it". This
class of no-bidder companies in research and development procurements is a pecu-
-17-
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liar class generated by the procurement process. They do not exist in and of
themselves, they are generated, as if we had a machine (perhaps a tabulating
machine in the procurement office) that created something. These companies,
called no-bidders after the fact, have the characteristics of not knowing a
thing about v.'hat is going in the particular award situation. Yet, of course,
the presence of such uninformed no-bidders changes a sole-source award to a com-
petitive procurement, the kind our Secretary of Defense says saves money. The
no-bidder firms may be very Imov/lcdgeable in other cases, where their persistent
interest would earn them an invitation to participate. But in the cases they no-
bid, their little knowledge of the contract background appears fit for a group
whose names v/ere drawn from a hat, even though we know that the process of soli-
citing potential bidders is more rational than such a random draw. Or is it?
Let us. look at the companies tha'C are somewhat more interesting, the winners
and the losers. X^hi distinguishes between these two groups? I shall indicate
several classes of distinction that give- you the kind of profile you should be
aiming for in your own companies if you want to move more often out of the loser
category into the winner circle. The results will be presented in two forms:
(l) the straightforward percentile responses that you all can understand immedi-
ately; and (2) a statistical significance level, a measure of confidence in the
results. The significance level is the probability that similar results might
have been produced somewhat randomly, without real differences existing between
the winners and losers. When the significance level is 10 per cent, for example,
a 10 per cent probability exists that the data might come from groups with similar
and not different characteristics. You may wish to focus on either one or both
sets of measures.
.18-

In presenting these data outcomes I shall proceed, somewhat in a time series,
beginning with the environment preceeding the RFP and going up to proposal sub-
mittal. One of the questions on our two-page questionnaires was, "Had your fii*m
performed contract work for this technical initiator (or his group) prior to the
issuance of the R.F.Po?" 6l^ of the winners said "Yes", while only 3^)-^ of the
losers had had prior contract experience with the group awarding the given con-
tract, a two to one difference in results that is statistically significant at
the 2$ level. V/e also asked about submittal of prior unsolicited proposals in
the same technical area. Again the factor of a two to one difference between
winners and losers shows up, with 32')^ of the winners having prior unsolicited
proposals against only 15'^ of the losers. These results, however, have a proba-
bility level between 10 and 20 per cent, far less significant statistically than
the contract work figures. On the question of anticipation of the R.F.P,, most
of the bidders did anticipate it in contrast to most of the no-bidders' lack
of anticipation. But even here there is a distinction between the winning and
the losing bidders, with three fourths of the winners but only half the losers
expecting the R.F.P. (significant at a level between 10 and 20 per cent).
One interesting pair of questions related to the possibilities that the
award appeared "wired" for a particular organization. V/e asked first, "Did the
procurement appear to 'belong' to someone else?" Only 8'^ of the winners thought
the job belonged to another firm. In fact, they were probably right but a rever-
sal later occurred because of a unique proposal or more simply because the pre-
ferred firm did not bid. But 2.k'f> of the losers, a difference of three to one
relative to the winners' responses, thought the job belonged to someone else yet
they still bid. Thus one out of every four losers went into a competition that
was believed to be rigged and, of course^ lost J (These results are also signifi-
cant at the 10 to 20 per cent level of probable occurrance.) Going one more
-19-

stej) we asked, "Did it appear to 'belong' to your firm?" 36^° of the winners but
only 95^ of the losers said, "Yes", a difference of four to one that is statis-
tically significant at less than the ^0 probability level.
V/e asked the bidders for other assessments of how they felt and what they
did about the R.F.P. "Was contact established with the customer's technical per-
sonnel (who were responsible for this procurement) following receipt of the
R.F.P. but prior to proposal submission?" This act is very often illegal under
the Armed Services Procurement Regulations (ASPR), yet apparently it is also
often performed. 50^ of the winners did it as opposed to 30^ of the losers, sta-
tistically significant at only the 10 to 20 per cent level. 70^ of the winners,
versus ^5^ of the losers, said they "had an advantage over a hypothesized company
of equal technical competence whose knowledge of customer requirements was limited
solely to information contained in the R.F.P." These results occur in the 10 to
20 per cent significance range. Finally, in the same vein we asked the respondents
to indicate how high in the customer's priority scale they believed the procure-
ment to be. The winners regarded the situations as higher in priority, i.e. more
likely to result in an award, etc., than did the losers, the difference in their
answers being highly significant, at the 2^ level of probability of occurrance.
Let me now turn to a set of three questions on the proposal preparation phase.
Question 13 on our mail questionnaire queried: "Was the technical approach of
your proposal in any way designed to satisfy known technical preferences of the
customer?" 68^ of the winners knew and responded to technical preferences of
the customer but only half as many, 33^, of the losers so acted. This difference
is statistically significant at between the l/lO of 1^ and the 1^ level of proba-
bility, a highly significant characteristic difference. Next we asked, "Was the
proposal content specifically directed toward particular individuals?" Again
-20-

the empirical results showed a two to one difference between winners and losers,
significant in the 10 and 20 per cent range. 28'/o of the winners directed their
proposals at particular individuals while only ih^o of the losers similarly be-
haved. All of these results support the notion that prior contacts are crucial
to the award process, manifested in the winners' answers to these two questions.
As a final point we also asked, "Did the proposal team contain a member whose
principal organizational responsibility was technical writing?" l6^ of the
winners used technical writers as part of the proposal effort, but 36^ of the .
losers, over twice as many, used them, these results occurring at the 10 per cent
level of statistical significance. It appears that if you felt you needed a
technical writer to help beef up your proposal, you were probably in bad shape
competitively. It is not the proposal effort and proposal writing that wins
the contracts; it is what takes place beforehand.
I should like to briefly mention another source of information on company
strategy and effectiveness in winning R&D contracts. In addition to the data
just cited from several hundred mail questionnaire returns (and our analyses of
these data have just begun), we have also gathered information from a series of
intensive interview- oriented company studies of marketing and engineering decision-
making in R&D. This approach, now revised to a form that can be self-administered
by cooperating con^janies without the expense of long interviews, is being used
for a comparative study of medi-am-to- large New England electronics companies.
In each study we work with the company to establish a representative sample of
twenty to forty bid- no bid decision sitiiations in the past year or two. Then
we gather the data and attempt to determine the correlates of success and failure
in the firm.
Let me relate the results drawn from one of our pilot studies in which we
have been debugging our research approach. ' The organization studied called
-21-

itself a research laboratory but engaged in both research and development con-
tracts. A niiraber of significant answers v/ere obtained throughout the company's
sampled cases. First, and perhaps obviously, whether or not the R.F.P. was
anticipated correlated highly with win or loss. Second, frequent customer con-
tact correlated very significantly, at the 2/1O of 1^ probability level, with
the organization's win record. A third question asked, "Did the company feel
it was not at a disadvantage relative to its competition?" A very high positive
correlation with success v/as obtained with results of that question. "Did the
company direct the technical solution of the problem to the particular organiza-
tion?" Again we found a very high significance level correlating with the awards.
The last evidence I shall cite is another slant on the proposal effort data in-
dicated earlier in Figure 6. We checked whether or not the company's proposal
effort in dollars amounted to less than ifo of the award price. This answer
correlated at the yjo significance level, a highly potent result, with the awards
to the company. If the firm spent less than 1'^, it tended to succeed; if it spent
more than l^o, the company tended to lose. Why? We doubt that the extra expendi-
tures hurt the company] Rather, we believe that in general if the company felt
it had to spend more on the proposal effort, it probably should not have been
in the situation in the first place. Thus, the size of the proposal effort was
a sign of company insecurity about its chances of winning.
Let me now draw from our research results some conclusions for marketing
and engineering strategies in the R&D field. The conclusions are relatively
simple. If in fact the award of research and development contracts is dominated
by face-to-face, person-to-person contact, technicial exchange, confidence devel-
opment, then those are the things you have to take into account. What kinds
of specific things can you do?
__po_ '^ J^pp^

First, in making bid-no bid decisions, think about the underlying factor
of face-to-face, person-to-person confidence development. If you have not been
in on the pre-R.F.P. phase of the procurement, begin by saying, "We should prob-
ably no-bid this R.F.P., unless this is an exceptional situation in which over-
all strategy reasons cause a bid." But, in general, you should expect to lose
the award unless you are confident that you have been into this particular cus-
tomer's organization in advance contact with the technical people. You ought
to feel that you have established a good relationship with the technical group
issuing the R.F.P. Don't ask the first question that so many companies ask. In
a number of our studies we found that companies first ask, "Do we have technical
competence in this area?" That is a relevant question to ask, but it is not the
correct first question. You should first inquire, "Have we demonstrated what-
ever technical competence we have to the particular organization that has issued
this R.F.P,?" If you have not yet engaged in "competence demonstration", start
off with a black mark on your record, and see if you are so exceptional in other
regards that you can overlook this black mark. Remember that you will probably
lose the contract if you bid on a job in an area where you have not yet persuaded
the customer of your competence.
The second area that we ought to treat as important is the area of engineer-
ing budgeting. Too much of the engineering budget intended for generating new
business is going into proposal preparation. Much less engineering time and money
should be put into formal proposal preparation. It should be diverted to in-house
research, research publications for in-house and external circulation, and engi-
neering travel. Get the engineers out of the laboratory when they have something
to sell, and get them to the guy who eventually is going to be the customer. You
will not make the government technical man your customer, \inless the engineer
has had an opportunity to present himself and his ideas and his competence to
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the customer, in the customer's organization, in a technical exchange.
What is the role of marketing in all of this? The role of marketing in
the field office is not "crimarily to be friendly '..'ith the government secretaries
nor to be able to read unside do^/n so that you knov v;-hich R.F.P. s are coming out.
Be friendly with the secretaries, if you wish. Also know which R.F.P. s are coming
out, but knov; this in order to advise your organization that an area seems to be
picking up in business potential. This does not say that your firm should bid on
these discovered R.F. P.e. It suggests that your company should start generating
some competence in the area. When your company later has something worth selling,
by that time the field marketing man should have established contacts with the
government technical organization and should understand who is doing that kind
of work and who is interested in the work. The field marketing man should be
trying to make sure that his firm's technical people get a chance to see, know of,
and be knov/n by those government technical people in their own fields. Perhaps
six months after such initial contacts it may be possible to generate the unsoli-
cited proposal or the informally unsolicited proposal that is the preferred sole
source situation leading to the R&D awards discussed here. In the home office
the marKeting man should fight to educate his organization to the points of view
preached above, and should use whatever veto power he can muster to enforce the set
of resulting policies.
The evidences shown this morning should have demonstrated that these are
the facts of the R&D business. Whether or not the business is conducted in the
way it ought to be is an entirely separate question. My personal opinion is that
the research and development contracting business ought to be far more open in
this regard. I do not believe that we should have as much phony formal competi-
tion as we do. I think that technical men in government should be more free
from fear of artificial rules and regulations, and from interference by unknowing
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people. But I think that in your situation as marketing nanagers in industry,
you ought first to recognize what are the facts, and I am convinced that these
are the facts.
-25-
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